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Abstract:
Since the Oslo Accords were signed in the mid-1990s, conflict resolution regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict has
been guided by two conjoined premises regarding: (1) the identity and right to self-determination of the two
‘peoples’ involved, Jewish and Palestinian-Arab; and (2) Israel’s sovereignty, or lack of it, in different portions of
Mandate Palestine. Although these twin premises are now treated as givens, in tandem they have paradoxically
proved ruinous to the well-being of civilians living under occupation by fostering futile notions that peace can be
achieved through geographic partition to serve these two rival ethno-national state projects. This approach is
fundamentally flawed in basing its goals on the purported legitimacy of the Jewish-settler ideology that ethnically
dismembered the ‘Palestinian people’ as conceived by the League of Nations and the British Mandate; and (2) in
endorsing a derivative form of Palestinian-Arab ethno-nationalism that, in stressing the Arab character of a
Palestinian state, has also become anachronistic in light of demographic realities presented by the advanced
settler-colonial society now embedded in the Mandate geography. This article accordingly argues that partition to
accommodate two peoples in one land would paradoxically recognize ethno-nationalism as legitimate in ways
that will sustain their inherent ethnic biases and so perpetuate conditions disabling to a stable peace. Drawing on
comparative political theory regarding the periodic reconstruction of ‘peoples’ and constructivist international
relations theory regarding the nation-state premise for state sovereignty, this article proposes that these premises
must be reassessed to suit the current condition of advanced settler colonialism in Mandate Palestine, which
compels full geographic and political unification.

Since the war of 1967 brought additional Palestinian and Syrian territories under Israel’s rule,
international diplomacy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict has been guided by two premises generally
deemed incontestable on ethical and legal grounds. Both concern questions of Israel’s sovereignty and
both are connected to international norms that, in theory and practice, are understood to construct the
rules and norms of the international system itself, rendering them sacrosanct. Now, twenty years after
the Oslo Accords were signed in the mid-1990s, these very premises must arguably come into
question, for one practical and compelling reason: sustaining them in this case has paradoxically
proved actively damaging to international peace and security and to the welfare of civilians on the
ground. Yet I propose that this situation is not as unique as it might appear: it has many precedents,
involving histories elsewhere we can identify as settler-colonial, and employing that analytical lens
makes immediate sense of a dramatically different approach.
The historical and theoretical framework for that paradigm shift is fleshed out in later
sections, but the point of departure can be summarized briefly: the observed failure of the Oslo
Accords. Although the 1995 Accord mapped out a peace process projected to culminate within five
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years, twenty years later Israel’s regime of control in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) retains
the same or more grave character it had prior to the Accords. Israeli settlements continue to expand
inexorably, following master plans drawn up long before the Oslo Accords, and have tripled in
population and geographic scope. Draconian restrictions on Palestinian rights and freedoms,
particularly on movement and trade, have confined Palestinian society to increasingly suffocating
enclaves, such that daily conditions faced by Palestinians in the OPT—and polarization between
Jewish and Palestinian populations—are demonstrably far worse than before the Accords. Occasional
third-party initiatives regularly described as “fresh” (such as the Annapolis Agreement) have made no
difference; the “peace process” remains stalled over the same final-status issues that have stalled
agreements since 1948 (such as water, Jerusalem, final borders and the Palestinian right of return)..
Continuing in this fashion is clearly untenable. Periodic convulsions—such as the 2014 Israeli
military attack on Gaza that took nearly two thousand civilian lives and left over one-hundred
thousand people homeless—destabilize the region and foster polarization and extremist political
reaction globally. The human suffering and international insecurity generated by this scenario inspires
the project proposed here: go back to basics to track what went wrong and explore whether
abandoning core tenets will permit a more workable paradigm to be constructed from the bottom up.
The first premise to bring under the international spotlight is that, because Israel is recognized
as sovereign inside its internationally recognized borders, anything to do with Israel’s domestic affairs
is considered to reside outside the remit of peace negotiations or international concern.1 This essential
norm of the Westphalian system—non-interference in the domestic affairs of states—is so basic a
pillar of international law that it can be seen as constitutive of the modern state system itself.2 But in
this case, it has removed from analytical or diplomatic critique the most important factor steering this
conflict: that is the doctrine, enshrined in Israel’s Basic Law, establishing Israel as an ethnic (Jewish)
state. Although this doctrine has gained much international sympathy in Israel’s case, due to the
ghastly history of anti-Semitism, it is a simple matter of observation to recognize that it has driven
and continues to drive all Israeli policies relevant to the conflict: not least, expelling Palestinians to
the OPT in the first place (in 1948 and 1967) solely on grounds that they are not Jews; rejecting any
right of return for Palestinian refugees, again solely because they are not Jews; and imposing
draconian measures to forcibly separate Jewish and Palestinian populations (in East Jerusalem and the
West Bank by constructing the Wall and in Gaza by sealing the territory entirely). Since these policies
actually define the Palestinian problem, and are certainly non-negotiable within the Palestinian
national identity and discourse, bracketing the doctrine that drives them as falling outside the remit of
international concern is ultimately futile. (A heuristic comparison to illustrate this point is the obvious
futility of attempting conflict resolution in apartheid South Africa without addressing the underlying
doctrine of racial division that drove apartheid’s logics.) Precisely how to treat that doctrine is then
the question, as explored below.

Israel’s internationally recognized borders are those established by the Armistice Agreement of 1949 but this
point was never entirely settled. General Assembly Resolution 273 (1949) admitting Israel as a member state of
the United Nations includes reference to ‘declarations and explanations’ which clarify that, at the time, Israel’s
borders were understood still to be under negotiation. In practice, international diplomacy has accepted Israel’s
sovereignty within the Armistice (green) line and not formally accepted it beyond that line.
1

2

See especially the body of literature in constructivist international relations: for example, Thomas Biersteker
and Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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The second premise is corollary to the first: that Israel is not the rightful sovereign in the
Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel has not contested this premise of
non-sovereignty openly: in calling the OPT “disputed” territory, Israel’s diplomatic position is that its
legal status remains undetermined. For United Nations (UN) committees and the great majority of
international lawyers, however, the legal situation is categorical: Israel is the belligerent occupant of
the OPT and law applicable to Israel’s role and responsibilities remains international humanitarian
law (IHL), particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, which establishes the obligations of the
occupying power regarding civilians in time of war. In this view, Israel cannot lawfully annex any of
the OPT unilaterally and must never be allowed to do so, however long the occupation might last,
outside a territorial agreement with the Palestinians. To propose that Israel is actually sovereign in the
OPT would therefore be seen by these authorities as inadmissible, most broadly because it could be
interpreted to endorse Israel’s acquisition of territory by force (violating a core norm of international
law) and deprive Palestinians of the last territorial expression of their right to self-determination.3
These two premises have guided the current “vision” (as expressed in diplomacy and several
UN resolutions) that the conflict must be resolved through partition: that is, a two-state solution.4
“Ending the occupation” (the common pro-Palestinian activist slogan) is understood to require that
Israel withdraw from the OPT, whether totally or with mutually accepted border adjustments.
Operating in tandem, they entirely elide any question about Israel’s discriminatory national ideology
by holding that the proper solution to its impact is to confine its application to the sovereign state of
Israel and remove Palestinians in the OPT from its scope by according full sovereignty to the
Palestinian people.
I propose that these premises about sovereignty must now be reconsidered: not because they
are unsound in a strictly legal sense but because they are actually functioning to perpetuate the
Palestinian problem. Paradoxically, not recognising Israel as the juridical sovereign in the OPT has
sustained the very conditions essential to Israel’s continued hold on them and indeed to their ultimate
annexation by Israel. The reason is simple. Constructing Jewish-only settlements in East Jerusalem
and the West Bank is Israel’s principal strategy for ensuring Israel’s ultimate permanent control over
these territories: the stated aim is to confine the Palestinian population to disarticulated and politically
disabled ethnic enclaves surrounded by Jewish-only lands and cities, to the point that facts on the
ground drive terms of the final peace agreement and convey most of the West Bank and all of East

3

Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) clarified this in operative paragraph 1(a), which affirmed as a
principle ‘withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’. This expectation
was reiterated by the International Court of Justice The prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force has
been interpreted as common law since the prohibition on aggression was built into the United Nations Charter.
For an overview of how the Palestinian right self-determination has been treated in international law, see
analysis by the legal team that contributed to Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism and International
Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Virginia Tilley, ed. (Pluto Press, 2012), pp. 65-75. The most
authoritative expression of this right was by the International Court of Justice in its Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Rep, 2004, 136 at 182–183, para. 118.
The formula “vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders”,
was expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 1397 of 2002 and reiterated in UN Security Council
Resolution 1515 of 2003. In both instruments, this phrase appears in the chapeau. In the latter instrument,
operative paragraph #2 includes the phrase “and to achieve the vision of two states living side by side in peace
and security”. Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 both link this “vision” to the “Quartet Performance-based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution”. Under terms of the Roadmap, Israel is not obligated to fulfil its
commitments to withdraw until the Palestinian Authority accomplishes a set of deeds that, a priori, were
impossible for it to achieve.
4
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Jerusalem to formal Israeli sovereignty.5 The key condition necessary to achieving this annexation
goal is that Palestinians have no capacity, whether militant or civil, to impede the settlements’
construction until Palestinians options are eliminated entirely by the comprehensive geography it will
ultimately generate. Were Israel to annex the OPT formally, the Palestinian population could then
demand full political rights as citizens, or as indigenous residents unjustly denied citizenship,
rendering Israel’s settlement policy unworkable from the pincer effect of a Palestinian civil rights
struggle and international recognition that such ethnic “separate development” equates with apartheid.
The answer was to design the Oslo Accords to cast the OPT (in foggy terms) as a proto-state, and
through this fiction normatively to preclude a civil rights challenge by casting Palestinians as citizensin-waiting of a Palestinian state to be established in the future. In this framework, the protogovernment—the Palestinian Authority—can also be held responsible for suppressing Palestinian
militancy. Hence Israel’s not being formally sovereign in the OPT is a strategy vital to Israel’s
annexation goals at this stage, and so far has been effective: Palestinians have been left in a liminal
condition, with no normative claim on equal civil rights from Israel, their rights being ascribed to
some hypothetical state of the future whose actual creation Israel’s settlement policies are designed
firmly to preclude.
Recognizing this paradox raises a dilemma of what to do about it, however, for even
questioning the premise of Israel’s non-sovereignty in the OPT can trigger immediate alarm. As noted
earlier, abandoning demands for Israel’s withdrawal from the OPT and recognizing Israel as
sovereign would effectively endorse the acquisition of territory by force. For the Palestinian people,
more specific objections arise: not least, whether recognising Israel as sovereign throughout the OPT,
even in order to hold it accountable for its violations of their human rights, would constitute a
humiliating national capitulation and crush their own vision of a Palestinian state. But conditions on
the ground suggest that both these views require interrogation. Is state responsibility for supporting
the international rule of law satisfied simply by continuing to hold an occupying power accountable to
withdraw if that state continually refuses? What happens when it remains in a territory for decades
and the scale of its colonisation reaches a stage where its withdrawal becomes logistically
unimaginable, as happened historically in other societies like the United States and Australia? Is it
then legally admissible—even morally compulsory—to abandon a well-grounded legal position, even
one considered a pillar of international law, that is demonstrably destructive to the rights and wellbeing of the people it was meant to protect? Is national self-determination for Palestinians locked into
a model of classic decolonization or can it adapt with dignity to a different model?
These questions bring us to consider more closely how the norms of sovereignty are
functioning for the protagonists in this case. Probed here is how Israel has manipulated them in the
interest of annexing the West Bank and how international law might address this manoeuvre.
International law has not often addressed cases where a state, although empirically sovereign in a
territory, deliberately abjured a claim to be the juridical sovereign precisely in order to avoid the
international obligations that would pertain if it were.6 In such a case, what are the responsibilities of
For a political and geopolitical analysis of this planning as a deliberate Israeli state strategy, see the author’s
The One-State Solution (2005), Chapter Two, ‘The Immovable Object’; for a more legal analysis, see the
analysis provided by the legal team contributing to Beyond Occupation, pp. 141-143 and especially 196-210.
5

6

I do not mean to elide here those cases of hegemonic influence codified under special arrangements, such as
those that frame United States relations with Puerto Rico and trusteeship territories in the Pacific. In these cases,
legal status, rights and respective authority are specified through international treaties and instruments designed
for them.
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third-party states? The first duty would seemingly be to compel the offending state’s withdrawal. But
if withdrawal is beyond international collective capacity or will to compel, could international
responsibility legitimately shift ground to hold the offending state accountable for all the legal
obligations that accrue with the sovereignty it has peremptorily seized, including the onus of
providing citizenship and equal civil rights to the entire territorial population? In short, should the
international community insist that the offending state finally choose between withdrawal and full
sovereignty—that is, go out or up? And if the occupying power rejects the former course—as we can
anticipate in this case---is there any legitimate basis whatever in international law and norms for
accepting the latter choice as legitimate?
It is unlikely, for reasons already given, that Israel will be required to announce its preferred
course of action regarding the OPT, since the present murky state of affairs serves Israel’s interests so
strongly and Israel’s allies, including some holding Security Council veto power, are unlikely to insist
on it. Anticipating that Israel will not withdraw, however, I propose that Israel’s assuming full
sovereignty is not only admissible but imperative, and furthermore consistent with international
precedent. First, I will briefly review the difference between empirical and juridical sovereignty in
order to clarify how Israel is employing the difference to its strategic advantage in this case. Second, I
propose a definitional difference between classic colonialism and settler colonialism in order to
illustrate how conflicts arising from these two types of domination call for different solutions. This
involves noting that both the international community and indigenous peoples living under maturing
settler-colonial regimes have reacted to advanced cases of settler colonialism by holding the settler
state accountable for human rights and non-discriminatory behaviour for its entire territorial
population: the illustrative comparison offered here is black African resistance to apartheid in South
Africa. These arguments are intended to suggest that Palestinian politics and international approaches
to Israel’s status in the OPT can legitimately shift ground, and should do so in the interests of a stable
peace for both sides and the national rights of Palestinian people, including humanitarian concern for
the population under Israel’s authority.

Empirical and Juridical Sovereignty in Israel-Palestine
The distinction drawn here between juridical and empirical sovereignty derives from early
work by Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, who pointed out what while all African states are
legally sovereign in the sense of enjoying international recognition, many lack empirical sovereignty
in the Weberian sense of monopolising the legitimate use of force and certainly in the Gramscian
sense of enjoying hegemonic authority over the territory population.7 Some states lack it simply
because state capacity is constrained by low budgets and large distances, as in parts of the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Other states confront rivals or secessionist movements that hold effective control
over parts of the country: e.g., Polisario’s ongoing challenge to Morocco in the Western Sahara and
the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria in 1967. Where a state loses all empirical sovereignty,
it becomes a “failed state,” greatly worrisome to international affairs because its population cannot be
held to account and ensuing instability spills across international borders: e.g., the regional spill-over
effects of the anarchy in Libya after the fall of Qaddafy.

‘Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: the Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood’, World Politics Vol. 35, No.
1 (1982); also see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(Cambridge, 1993).
7
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The problem addressed here, however, is a more subtle one. Disputes about sovereignty
normally involve rival claims between states or between states and non-state actors (like revolutionary
movements) for juridical sovereignty: that is, international diplomatic recognition by other states that
one or the other party has the legal right to govern a territory. This recognition is the prize for which
conflicts are fought because, in the modern world system, sovereignty alone conveys the rights and
privileges that accrue to statehood under international law: e.g., exclusive rights to administer natural
resources, control borders, regulate trade, negotiate with other states to resolve regional issues, and so
forth. (Hence Israel’s gaining United States recognition within hours of its Declaration of
Independence, a step that would lead to Israel’s admission to the United Nations, was the triumph for
which political Zionism had struggled since its inception, and full diplomatic recognition of a “State
of Palestine” is presently a central tenet of the Palestinian Authority and much of the Palestinian
national movement.) So vital is juridical sovereignty that states cling tenaciously to it even where
empirical sovereignty – the capacity actually to govern the territory—is weak or missing.
But international law and relations are not commonly confronted by the reverse situation,
where a state enjoys uncontested empirical sovereignty but eschews juridical sovereignty: that is, it
deliberately does not legally annex a territory formally but nonetheless retains exclusive control over
its borders, population and resources, and administers it in all ways indistinguishable from the normal
perks and practices of sovereignty. This appears to be what Israel has done. It has not claimed
sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, continuing to call them “disputed” territories, unlike
its policy in the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Yet Israel enforces—and insists on—exclusive or
veto authority over all internal matters pertaining to sovereignty in East Jerusalem and the West Bank,
including internal governance as well as all external trade, movement and security.8 In sum, Israel is
incontestably the sovereign power throughout Mandate Palestine in all ways but name.
This strange situation is now often described as a “prolonged military occupation” and
drawing attention from scholars as a distinct legal oddity.9 (Normally, military occupation is a
temporary state of affairs that does not entail the extensive demographic and civil engineering that
Israel has effected in the OPT and which are raising theoretical difficulties for IHL.) But a further
question is raised here: if prolonged occupation is discovered to reflect not merely a stalled diplomatic
process but a deliberate ploy designed to serve annexation, it can be recognised to fall into a new legal
category. One such category, often raised in polemics on the conflict, is colonialism; another is
apartheid.10 A variant is settler colonialism, which would seem a mere subtype of colonialism
especially in suggesting that it might be reversed. But settler colonialism has features which

8

Despite the putative autonomy provided to the Palestinian interim Self-Government Authority, Israel has
retained plenary power over all governance sectors in the OPT by arranging for matters falling under the PA’s
ambit to be governed by joint committees on which both sides hold a veto. Since the status quo favours Israel’s
interests, this allows Israel to prevent the PA from making changes that impede Israel’s Master Plans for the
OPT. For an analysis of how this policy replicates juridical arrangements for the South African Bantustans, see
the author’s ‘A Palestinian Declaration of Independence: Implications for Peace’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 17,
Issue 1 (Spring 2010).
See, e.g., Adam Roberts, ‘Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967’ The
American Journal of International Law Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan 1990); Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross, and
Keren Michaeli, ‘Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, Berkeley Journal of
International Law Vol. 23, Issue 3; Special Rapporteur Richard Falk reflected this debate in a recommendation
to the Human Rights Council in his final report of 13 January 2014: see A/HRC/25/67.
9

10

The most exhaustive treatment of these questions from a legal perspective is presented in Beyond Occupation:
Apartheid, Colonialism and International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Pluto Press, 2012).
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distinguish it from other kinds of colonialism, have not proved reversible, and, in the past, have
merited a strikingly different international response. Considering its special configuration and history
will support the argument that this same historical response is now both appropriate and necessary in
Israel-Palestine.
Classic and Settler Colonialism in Israel and South Africa
Although settler-colonialism is rightly treated as a subtype of colonialism, it should not
simply be conflated with it. Colonialism is very broad term that has been used for a wide range of
situations and practices, but is commonly understood as a state’s claiming exclusive dominion over
territory outside its internationally recognised borders and governing it through methods that deny
self-determination to that territory’s indigenous people. 11 As it was practiced by European powers
between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, such “classic” colonialism was motivated primarily by
metropolitan quests for raw materials and markets. On this agenda, the colonising power administered
the colony and its population in all respects with the home country’s interests narrowly in mind.
Claims of terra nullius usually authorised this legally, although “empty land” meant “empty of
government” in the sense of European government (what the Spanish colonizers more frankly called
sín política—without political order). Since few colonised lands were empty of government, being
populated and governed by indigenous polities and states, this claim required that colonial doctrine
develop discourses of superiority regarding race and/or civilisation in order to make moral sense of
extinguishing colonised peoples’ sovereignty. Decolonisation in cases of classic colonialism therefore
involved the obvious remedy: withdrawal by the colonising power and return of independent
governance to the territory’s autochthonous people.
Settler-colonialism reproduces many features of classic colonialism: not least, the hallmark
ideologies of domination and denigration of native peoples. But the term settler flags a distinct pattern
in which an immigrant (usually European) population settled en masse in a territory outside its home
country and ultimately establishes a government there whose institutions and politics reflect and serve
its own cultural predilections and interests. Historically, this process has included permanently
dispossessing and marginalising—even exterminating—the indigenous population. Some scholars
have accordingly explored cases of settler colonialism as a variant of colonialism while others have
treated it as a type of nation-state formation. But its status in international law remains almost entirely
unexplored. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
(1960) denounced “colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”, which would seem to cover
settler colonialism, but did not address its distinct character. Other international law has ignored it,
except in two carefully circumscribed legal instruments relating to indigenous peoples’ social and
cultural rights within existing states.12 The reason for this lacuna is not mere neglect: many United
Nations member states today are settler-colonial states in the sense described here, including every
state in the Americas as well as Australia and New Zealand, and none of their governments wishes to
find recidivist indigenous challenges to their sovereignty coming before international courts.

By ‘commonly’ I mean primarily language and norms formulated by the United Nations Committee on
Decolonisation, which was established to monitor cases of decolonisation, implementing UN Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
11

These instruments are principally the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 169 on the Rights of
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(2007).
12
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The resulting silence in international law has arguably contributed to a strategic error in
addressing settler-colonialism in the case of Palestine. Those who criticize Israel’s policies in the OPT
on grounds of colonialism routinely call for the remedy associated with classic colonialism: that is,
Israel’s withdrawal from colonised territory. But conflicts involving settler colonialism in the
Americas, south Pacific and South Africa have not been resolved this way. To understand why a quite
different remedy has been sought requires examining more closely how settler colonialism differs
from classic colonialism.
The first and most obvious way that settler-colonialism is distinguished from classic
colonialism is the evaporation of the home country from the political equation. The hallmark of settler
colonialism is a comprehensive indigenisation of the settler population, in which the settler population
detaches politically, psychologically and ideologically from any extra-territorial metropol that can be
held accountable for its behaviour and to whose territory it can be expected to return. In conceptually
re-attaching its (mythic) origins and destiny to the new territory, a settler-colonial society further
develops a particularly tenacious understanding of its own rights to and needs for the territory, which
extend to equating settler sovereignty with the settler society’s physical survival. Iterated as doctrines
that the settler society has natural rights to preserve its dominion over the settled country and human
rights as individuals to be protected in doing so, this identification of the settler society with the land
translates into a sense of moral entitlement that militates powerfully against the settlers accepting any
notion that they should withdraw. At some point, withdrawal indeed becomes unimaginable to
settlers, even (depending on how much power they hold) risible.
The second factor distinguishing settler colonialism is the settler society’s normative
appropriation of the right of self-determination. Classic colonialism was discredited in the twentieth
century partly by its obvious denial of the right to self-determination, held by native peoples; the
remedy was to restore this right by withdrawing the colonial government. By contrast, settler
colonialists make moral sense of dispossessing indigenous peoples permanently of their land partly by
claiming this right themselves. A canon of standard discursive devices is enlisted to this end: for
example, locally tailored myths about why the native peoples lack any legitimate claim to land that
settler mythology typically holds was terra nullius prior to the settlers’ arrival; frontier myths, draped
in heroic nationalist symbols, which cast indigenous resistance as cruel persecution of the innocent
settler; and social-Darwinist logics proposing the native peoples’ permanently inferior cultural status
relative to the settler society, putatively evidenced by (among other things) their military defeat.
Continuing resistance by indigenous peoples to settler invasions is then interpreted as the doomed
irredentism of inferior if not obsolete cultures. Indigenous motives are derided as irrational,
essentially racist in motive, and beyond any moral pale in targeting an innocent, idealistic and hardworking settler population that has reclaimed the land from wilderness. Any indigenous population
remaining in the settler-colonial state’s territory after its independence is therefore a cultural
anachronism, tolerated if passive but still suspect for harbouring recidivist , if hopeless, seditious
ambitions. Defeat and liquidation of such savage backward cultures is therefore seen as necessary in
the short run but also inevitable over the march of time. Such people certainly do not merit, in settler
imagination, a right to statehood; their loss of sovereignty itself was proof of that.
The third factor distinguishing settler colonialism from classic colonialism, and one clearly
relevant to Israel-Palestine, is its success in permanently extinguishing indigenous sovereignty by
converting indigenous politics into domestic concerns and removing them and their issues from the
ambit of international diplomacy. This is done by recognizing the exclusive juridical sovereignty of
the settler-colonial state. In modern world history, diplomatic recognition has been gained for settler
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states when the settler population grew and embedded in the territory to the point of dissolving any
idea by outsiders that it will ever withdraw (or can be compelled to do so) and the state it constructed
is deemed to be incontestably in charge of the territory. The contrast with classic colonialism—where
international norms in the twentieth century evolved to categorically reject foreign rule and require
the colonizer to withdraw—may be alarming to principled minds but is intuitively reasonable, for at
some tipping point in settler colonialism any idea of withdrawal simply becomes unimaginable. An
obvious illustration is the present-day United States, which no one today expects to dismantle and
hand over territory, even if now admitted to be unjustly acquired, to Native American nations who
now comprise about one percent of the territorial population. Yet this tipping point was reached long
ago, when the demographic balance was far less stark: probably, in the eastern United States, by the
late seventeenth century and in the rest of the country by the early nineteenth.13
Many other cases illustrate this pattern, in Latin America, North America, and the South
Pacific. For reasons of space, discussion here will focus on South Africa, arguably the comparison
closest to the Israeli-Palestinian formula. First, indigenization in settler South Africa was well
underway by the early eighteenth century, when the Dutch-speaking settler population reimagined
itself as an “Afrikaner” (Dutch: African) people in distinguishing its interests and character from
those of British rule. Especially after persecution by the British in the Boer Wars, Afrikaner
nationalism formally proposed that Afrikaners were morally and culturally cut off from Europe and,
in a classic blood-and-soil trope, could survive only on South African land. Second, Afrikaner
nationalism drew on pioneer mythology to support what was, to Afrikaners, an unassailable moral
claim to the right to self-determination. Black African peoples were argued to be incapable of modern
governance and their sovereignty—if admitted ever to have existed—was considered obsolete (until
the 1960s when black sovereignty was revived by the apartheid government in distorted form, as the
Bantustan scheme, designed to save white supremacy). Resistance to white settler sovereignty was
discredited in social-Darwinist terms as the irrational cruel attacks by savage and deceitful brutes on
peaceful heroic pioneers. Third, black Africans were progressively deprived of international standing
through their incremental redefinition as British subjects or South African citizens. By the latenineteenth century, white settlement throughout modern South African territory was universally
considered irreversible: the death throes of Black African sovereignty were in the Anglo-Zulu War
(1879). The ruinous impact of conquest and colonialism on black African lives, cultures and polities
did not prevent international recognition from flowed readily to the settler state as the country
morphed through British imperial rule and Commonwealth membership to republicanism. By the time
South Africa was reformulated as an independent state in the early twentieth century, any idea of
black sovereignty or secession, although ardently sought by several polities such as the Zulu nation,
could gain no international traction.
In a more compressed time frame, Israel’s “prolonged occupation” fits the same mould. First,
the Israeli Jewish population in Israel has thoroughly indigenised. While more Jews continue to live
outside of Israel than live in it, a distinctly Israeli Jewish national culture has developed over the past
century that is experienced and recognised by all who live there as unique, in the sense that Israel has
a unique national language, social norms and culture that cannot be exported or reproduced outside of
13

Debates between French and British colonial powers about the relative standing of North American Indian
nations illustrate that the erosion of Native American sovereignty was gradual and contested through the
nineteenth century: see, for example, Howard R. Berman, ‘Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776’, in Oren Lyons, et al, Exiled in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian nations
and the U.S. Constitution (Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers, 1992).
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the national geography that Zionism has reimagined and transformed in its own image. This collective
national life goes far beyond the Holocaust narrative that the Jews “have nowhere else to go”:
generations of Israeli Jews now have no sense of any other home country and would experience
departure as a kind of exile.14 Ideologically, this indigenisation has extended into the West Bank
settlements, particularly in the larger ones. For religious Zionists, it embraces all settlements.
Second, the Jewish-Israeli (Zionist) nationalist movement has appropriated the right to selfdetermination from the Palestinian people. As is usual for settler colonists, this claim builds from
romantic mythologised doctrines: in this case, especially Biblical authority (whether treated as
theological metaphor or objective history) that supports a claim of Jewish indigeneity and sovereignty
in Palestine in antiquity, buttressed by the heroic twentieth-century Zionist settler myth and the postHolocaust argument that the Jewish people require a state of their own for their very survival. The
Palestinian people’s claim to self-determination has also been rejected as absurd through the standard
discursive devices of settler colonialism: e.g., Palestinian Arabs were a primitive people that never
used the land productively (standard of civilisation); they were not present in the land anyway when
Zionist settlers arrived, except as migrant labourers (terra nullius); they were defeated by Zionist
forces due to their own intrinsic backwardness (social Darwinism); and they remain motivated solely
by irrational hatred for the Jewish people who are only engaged in a heroic project of selfdetermination. Zionist doctrine has thus rendered Palestinian-Arab national rights as nonsensical and
any notion of returning their sovereignty within the land of Eretz Israel as legally and morally
inadmissible.
Yet international recognition has flowed similarly to this settler-colonial state. In 1947, the
General Assembly rewarded Zionist settlement and state-building by voting to partition Mandate
Palestine into a “Jewish state” and an “Arab state”.15 In 1949, Palestinian sovereignty was
permanently extinguished within the Armistice (Green) Line when Israel was admitted to the United
Nations, thus converting the problems of Palestinians living inside Israel into Israel’s domestic affair
and slotting all other Palestinians into Israel’s penumbra as “the refugee problem”. Fifty years later,
this treatment was recognized as inadequate and corrected in new diplomacy favouring a two-state
solution, as noted earlier, but Zionism’s signal accomplishment as a settler colonial state has been to
cultivate international consensus that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination only in
disarticulated areas of Mandate Palestine. The Israeli government indeed proposes that sovereignty for
Palestinians in the West Bank is admissible only if a Palestinian state is deprived of definitive
qualities of sovereignty, such as any power to make an independent foreign policy, control over
Palestinian movement in and out of Palestinian territory and control over air space,
telecommunications, water management or any matter that crosses Israel’s borders.
Recognising that Israel’s policies in Mandate Palestine present us with case of settler
colonialism explains why, after a certain tipping point in its advance, settler colonialism forces a
different solution to the human rights violations it has generated. Still, how to recognize such a
tipping point, and how to accept what this portends for national resistance and ambitions by the

14

The remapping of Palestine as a Hebraised landscape is brilliantly described by Meron Benvenisti in his
Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948 (University of California Press, 2002).
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This observation is not intended to obscure the heavy-handed politics, driven particularly by the United
States, that went into this majority vote of the General Assembly in 1947: simple recognition of Jewish settler
demography was certainly not the only reason for recommending creation of a Jewish state. However, an
exposition of those politics is beyond the scope of this paper.
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colonized people, remains a thorny question. Naturally deep disagreements on this question exist.
Some Palestinians may cling to the memory that such a dispute characterised Arab politics in French
colonial Algeria in the mid-twentieth century, when many pieds noires had indigenised and could not
imagine either leaving or turning the country over to Arab governance, yet were eventually compelled
to do both. Such an eventuality cannot be anticipated in Israel, but even if it could, it would not be
possible without a regional convulsion that would entail immense human suffering of great danger to
international peace as well as to Palestinians living in the country.16 Yet, absent such a catastrophe,
how can justice for Palestinians now realistically be achieved? An answer is suggested, again, by the
closely related case of settler-colonialism in South Africa.

Seeking Justice in Settler-colonial States: Insights from South Africa
The previous section explains why, in cases of advanced settler-colonialism, movements for
indigenous rights have had to seek justice through modes other than the dominant society’s physical
withdrawal. Black African resistance confronted this precise dilemma in their resistance to apartheid.
At the height of Africa’s decolonisation era in the 1960s, several resistance parties—especially, the
African National Congress (ANC) and South African Communist Party (SACP)—held lengthy
internal debates about their national struggle against “colonialism of a special type”. A 1962 thesis on
the dilemma may strike a chord with Palestinians in the OPT:
The indigenous population is subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and
exploitation, lack of all democratic rights and political domination… Typical too of
imperialist rule is the reliance by the state upon brute force and terror…Non-White South
Africa is the colony of White South Africa itself. It is this combination of the worst features
of both imperialism and colonialism, within a single national frontier, which determines the
special nature of the South African system and has brought upon its rulers the justified hatred
and contempt of progressive and democratic people throughout the world. … “17
This understanding of colonialism “within a single national frontier” signals an adaptation in
black South African political thought: that advancing white domination had altered not only in scope
but in its essential quality and that resistance strategies had to adjust.18 South Africa historian Pallo
Jordan has mapped this political evolution as emerging through three historical stages. In the first
stage, which began with European colonisation in the mid-sixteenth century and extended through the
late-nineteenth century, southern African peoples fought to repel European assaults on their
sovereignty. In the second stage, which lasted into the mid-twentieth century, most southern African
peoples (the Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana and others) had irredeemably lost sovereignty to European
advance. Their resistance accordingly shifted to defending their social order, traditional authorities
and modes of production against full incorporation and subordination by the European society and its
economy. In the third phase, Black Africans recognized that they had been fully absorbed into the
settler state and its economy as a subordinated racial labouring caste and they could no longer
This author’s analysis of the permanency of Israel’s settlement throughout Mandate Palestine is presented at
length in The One-State Solution (U of Michigan, 2005), chapters 1 through 3. The same argument is
summarised in ‘The One-State Solution’, London Review of Books Vol. 25, No. 21 (6 November 2003).
16
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South African Communist Party, The Road to South African Freedom (1962), emphasis in original.

South African Minister of Arts and Culture Pallo Jordan, unpublished lecture, November 2008, Velmare
Hotel, Pretoria, hosted by the Middle East Project of the Human Sciences Research Council.
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anticipate withdrawal of a white settler society and state that had grown to such size and indigenised
with such nationalist passion.. Their struggle for justice shifted to a discourse of anti-discrimination
and equality: in other words, they appropriated the settler society’s own human rights norms and civil
rights in a bid for equal rights and privileges. This third and last stage was formulated as the
programme of the ANC: it guided the language in the 1955 Freedom Charter and culminated in the
1994 elections that eliminated white rule and launched South Africa’s landmark non-racial
constitution (1995). Crucially, third-stage resistance gained universal international support and was
ultimately victorious because it was consistent with post-World War II international human rights
norms, which rejected racial discrimination and held that all citizens of a country must be accorded
equal political, social, economic and cultural rights.
Applying this model to Palestine, we might conclude that Palestinians in the OPT are now
engaged in all three stages of resistance at once (possibly reflecting the relatively compressed time
frame of Zionist colonisation). The phase comparable to first-stage resistance may have been the early
Arab revolts in the 1920s and 1930s. A few small Palestinian factions, citing the success of Hizbullah
in expelling Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and remembering French Algeria, still cling to this
model, hoping that militancy—whether local or in some unforeseeable concert of Muslim or Arab
forces—can force the Jewish settler society to withdraw and ship back to the countries from whence it
came. The great majority of Palestinians in the OPT, however, have shifted to second-stage resistance,
in the form of sumud (steadfastness, endurance) in an attempt to resist the worst intrusions of Israeli
military and economic penetration, seeking to preserve their families and society in a shrinking but
still-distinct socio-political space lacking sovereign authority. A growing minority is shifting to thirdstage resistance: viewing Israeli sovereignty as effectively complete and certainly irreversible and so
leaning toward appropriating the liberal claims of Israeli democracy to demand full citizenship and
equal rights in a non-ethnic state.19 In this last manoeuvre, they would join (although greatly
complicate) the same struggle now being revitalized by Palestinian citizens of Israel. Yet, for some
Palestinians, formally endorsing third-stage resistance would only constitute an admission of defeat.
The comparison with South Africa also exposes the irony that this final move by the
Palestinians, although clearly consistent with international human rights law and norms, would
presently run counter to international consensus. In a striking reversal of the international position
taken regarding apartheid South Africa, the international community supports Israel in remaining a
state based on ethnic domination within its own borders: the question for international diplomacy is
only where those borders should be. But as Israel extends its doctrine of ethnic supremacy into its
governance of the OPT, the problem has become glaring: governing two populations in one territory
by different laws, ensuring domination of one over the other through a complex of laws and policies,
equates with apartheid. Whether international responsibility now requires imposing on the settler-
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Poll data shows widely varying results that appear to reflect the phrasing of the question. A 2007 survey by
Near East Consulting that asked the question in the most specific terms, ‘Support or opposition to a one-state
solution in historic Palestine where Muslims, Christians and Jews have equal rights and responsibilities’, found
70% support for this solution among Palestinians. The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre has
regularly found between 23-33 percent of Palestinians supporting a ‘binational state’ and about 12-13 percent
supporting a ‘Palestinian state’, both not defined further in the survey conditions: polls are available on the
JMCC website, available at: http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results.html.. For an overview, see discussion in
‘An Opening for Peace: Israelis, Palestinians and the Two-State Solution—Analysis’, Eurasia Review, 22
February 2014: accessed on 25 February 2014 from http://www.eurasiareview.com/22022014-opening-peaceisraelis-palestinians-two-state-solution-analysis/.

“After Oslo” – Virginia Tilley – Conflict, Security and Development

13

colonial government the obligations as well as privileges of full sovereignty—nondiscrimination,
equal rights—is the question before us.

Conclusion
Israel now governs the OPT in all ways consistent with sovereignty except the formal claim to
it. This restraint is not accidental or merely an impediment for Israel. Deliberately abjuring formal
sovereignty over the Palestinian population in the territory it governs, Israel’s latitude of action—its
empirical sovereignty—is actually enhanced. By disenfranchising the Palestinian civilian population
and ascribing their political rights to a fictional state of the future, Israel has rendered Palestinians
helpless to resist the elaborate project of civil and demographic engineering that will confine
Palestinian society to partial autonomy in a Bantustan. Viewing the conflict in this light suggests that
the only way to alter it is by treating the conflict as a case of advanced settler-colonialism. With a
half-million settlers now residing in the West Bank, Jewish settlement should indeed have been
recognised to have passed the tipping point some time ago, were the international community not still
wedded doggedly to the legal model of belligerent occupation.
Pointing out the deficiency of this argument is not meant to suggest that it is technically are
wrong. It is considered here to be legally incontestable that Israel holds the territories under
belligerent occupation and that its transfer of Jewish settlers into East Jerusalem and the West Bank is
illegal under IHL. The well-meaning intent of sustaining this model has also been to help guard and
preserve Palestinian national rights in the dwindling geographic sphere left to them. Yet the real-life
consequences of this posture for the Palestinians have been disastrous. They are left in limbo, with
neither IHL nor IHRL operating to protect them and excluded from domestic civil rights in the state
that holds all empirical sovereign powers over their lives and society. This trap, so conducive to
Israel’s annexation strategy, must be corrected by requiring that Israel adopt the responsibilities as
well as privileges of sovereignty and accord full citizenship, equal rights, and equal political voice to
the indigenous Palestinian people.
Recognizing Israel’s sovereignty throughout all of Mandate Palestine is not argued here to
reflect historical justice. Everywhere, recognising the sovereignty of settler states requires that those
indigenous peoples who have lost land, livelihoods, community, rights and collective dignity to a
mass alien invasion finally abandon their hope of gaining certain types of redress. Rather, this step
reflects recognition that power politics have irrevocably altered the terms in which justice and human
rights can be pursued. The only real defeat of a settler colonial state, once it has passed the tipping
point where withdrawal cannot be anticipated, is by eliminating its function as a vehicle for
perpetuating settler myths and racial discrimination. This transformation is a tough and painful one on
all sides, as the bitter struggle in South African attested. But the worst outcome for native peoples is a
situation that has passed the tipping point yet closes off this one path to liberation from racist settler
rule. When Palestinians decide to insist on this remedy, they will find—as did the ANC—that the
international community is much more forcefully on their side. To date, that community has been
remiss, rather than responsible, in not holding Israel juridically responsible for the privileges of
sovereignty it has otherwise seized so openly in Mandate Palestine.

